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Ioan-Radu Motoarcă
Patients, Corporate Attorneys, and Moral Obligations
Abstract. There are two main questions that any account of corporate
lawyers’ moral obligations needs to answer: (1) Do corporate lawyers have
moral obligations to third parties? and (2) In cases of conflict between
obligations to the corporation and obligations to third parties, which should
prevail? This Article offers answers to these questions in the context of lawyers
working in medical corporations. I argue that lawyers do have moral obligations
to third parties, and that in cases where patients’ rights are being violated by a
medical company, patients’ rights should prevail. Consequently, attorney–client
confidentiality rules should be relaxed to allow for attorney disclosures in
egregious cases of potential harm to third parties.
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This Article addresses the moral and legal obligations of corporate
attorneys working for medical companies1 in cases of corporate
wrongdoing. The paradigm case of misconduct that will be discussed is
when a medical corporation places a third party (typically patients) at an
increased risk of harm as a result of releasing inadequate medical products
into the market and refuses to acknowledge publicly reasonable evidence
concerning the inadequacy of the treatment. As United States law stands
right now, attorneys working for corporations are bound by confidentiality
rules and have limited options to disclose their client’s wrongdoing to
outside agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I will
argue that there are good reasons, at least in some cases, to relax the
confidentiality rules and allow attorneys to report their suspicions outside
the corporation in order to protect innocent people who might be victims
of the corporation’s actions.
Part I describes two cases in which a medical company released products
on the market that put patients at risk of harm. It also considers the role of
attorneys in a modern corporation. Part II focuses on the moral question
raised by the kind of corporate conduct discussed in Part I. Part III argues
that corporate attorneys have moral obligations to third parties (such as
patients at risk of harm) and rejects two counter-arguments to that claim.
Part IV considers why attorneys’ moral obligations to third parties are
difficult to outweigh by competing considerations. Part V addresses and
rejects the duty of confidentiality to clients as a basis for not complying with
a lawyer’s moral obligations. Part VI briefly addresses further suggestions
concerning the adoption of adequate confidentiality rules by the American
Bar Association (ABA).
I. DUTIES TO DISCLOSE FOR CORPORATE LAWYERS IN MEDICAL
COMPANIES TO SERVE THE PUBLIC GOOD
The moral and legal issues concerning corporate lawyers’ obligations that
are generated in the medical context are similar to those that arise in the case
of other types of companies. Nevertheless, medical corporations are worth
singling out because of two characteristics: (1) the potential of these
companies to cause serious and widespread harm to third parties; and (2) the
correlative stringency of corporate lawyers’ disclosure obligations, stemming
1. I will be using the term “medical company” to mean any company whose main line of
business involves providing medical goods or services. Pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology
companies are examples of medical companies in this sense.
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out of serious and widespread violations of third parties’ rights. Nonmedical companies may sometimes also be in a position to cause this kind
of harm, in which case similar considerations will apply.2
There have been many instances of medical corporate wrongdoing over
the years, most of them involving large public corporations.3 But private
companies have not been without blame either, as we shall see shortly. In
order to illustrate the kind of cases the discussion will be focusing on, this
section will briefly describe two cases, one involving a public pharmaceutical
corporation, and the other one a private biotechnology company.
The corporate attorneys’ conduct in these cases will also be addressed.
A. Big Pharma and the Vioxx Case
Pharmaceutical giant Merck managed to get a prescription drug called
“Vioxx” approved by the FDA in May 1999.4 The medication was designed
to relieve pain and inflammation caused by osteoarthritis, rheumatoid
arthritis, menstrual pain, and migraines.5 In September 2004, as a
consequence of clinical trial data showing that Vioxx increased the risk of
adverse cardiovascular events like heart attack and stroke, Merck withdrew
the drug from the market.6 Thousands of personal injury lawsuits followed,
as well as 265 class action lawsuits based on claims of failure to warn about
the negative effects of the drug.7 For the period between 1999 and 2004,
while Vioxx was on the market, it is estimated that around 20 million people
took the drug in the United States,8 and one study conducted by David G.
Graham (at the time Associate Director for Science at the FDA Office of
2. Companies that sell tobacco, dietary supplements, or nicotine-based products are some
examples among others. To what extent the proposal in this Article will apply in those cases will
depend on a variety of factors, such as how much knowledge general consumers have about the
products they are purchasing and how serious the harm of nondisclosure would be in a particular
situation. Certainly, on the view advocated in this Article, non-medical companies should not be free
to violate people’s rights by not disclosing relevant information. Consequently, and as will be argued
below, the strength of attorneys’ duty of confidentiality will need to be re-assessed in some contexts.
3. See, e.g., The Biggest Ever Pharmaceutical Lawsuits, PHARM. TECH. (June 25, 2019),
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/biggest-pharmaceutical-lawsuits/ [https://
perma.cc/YFG7-476K] (listing ten of the biggest drug manufacturer lawsuit settlements).
4. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 758 (E.D. La. 2011).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 758–59.
7. Jennifer Wolsing, The Vioxx Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Misdirected Tort
Rules, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 209, 210 (2008). The number of personal injury lawsuits was in excess of
28,000. Id.
8. In re Vioxx, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
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Drug Safety) concluded that 27,000 heart attacks and cardiac deaths may
have been avoided if people had taken other medication.9
All these facts are consistent with Merck’s ignorance of the negative
effects of Vioxx and with its marketing the drug in good faith. However,
there is evidence that Merck had been apprised of the potential
cardiovascular effects of Vioxx well before the decision to withdraw it. For
instance, in an internal email, Merck scientists observed that “the possibility
of CV events is of great concern.”10 The email also suggested that “highrisk patients should be excluded [presumably from study results] so that the
difference between Vioxx patients and others ‘would not be evident.’”11
Furthermore, the New England Journal of Medicine, where Merck had published
the results of a Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR)
clinical trial in 2000, later revealed that “Merck had deleted data about three
heart attacks” before submitting the VIGOR results to the journal and
accused Merck of manipulating the trial results.12 The VIGOR trial results
themselves, partial as they were, indicated that Vioxx could lead to as many
as four times the number of heart attacks as the competitor drug
naproxen,13 but Merck continued to deny the correlation between Vioxx
and cardiovascular problems, and continued to market the drug without
notifying physicians of the increased cardiovascular risks.14 Merck also
preferred to ignore or hide certain inconvenient results that could affect the
marketability of Vioxx. For example, it conducted an internal clinical trial
in 1998 (“Study 090”) which showed that the incidence of cardiovascular
events for patients taking Vioxx was almost six times higher than for
patients taking other arthritis drugs or placebos.15 The company did not
publish the results.16 Similarly, after doing an internal meta-analysis which
showed that Vioxx patients had twice as high a risk of having a heart attack
9. Walter T. Champion, The Vioxx Litigation Paradigm: The Search for Smoking Guns,
31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 164 (2006).
10. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 166–67.
13. Id. at 166.
14. Id. at 170–72; David R. Culp & Isobel Berry, Merck and the Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty,
22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 20–21 (2007). Merck relied on the theory that naproxen
benefited the heart and Vioxx had no effect, hence the difference in cardiovascular events among the
two groups of patients. However, Merck did nothing to test this hypothesis, mainly because it was
concerned about losing profits in case it had to put warnings on its label. Id. at 22–23.
15. Culp & Berry, supra note 14, at 19.
16. Id.
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as patients who took other painkillers, Merck gave the FDA only part of the
results and did not include the rates at which Vioxx patients would incur
heart attacks.17
After massive litigation, some fueled by Merck’s pattern of denial and
obfuscation, a global settlement was reached in 2007 between the company
and a Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Counsel, according to which Merck established
a $4.85 billion fund for resolving pending or tolled claims of heart attack,
ischemic stroke, and sudden cardiac arrest against the company.18 It was
one of the largest settlements in civil litigation history.19
B. Theranos and the Brave New World of Biotech Startups
Public companies are not the only ones plagued by legal problems
stemming from disreputable ways of conducting business. While Merck was
forced into a steep settlement by allegations of personal injury and failure to
warn, Theranos was brought down as a result of egregious violations of
federal securities laws. The most publicized scandal in the world of
biotechnology companies in recent years, the case of Theranos serves as a
reminder of the social and human costs of fraudulent corporate
management and bad corporate culture.20 From its position as “one of the
most valuable private companies in Silicon Valley, one of the fabled
unicorns[,]”21 whose founder Elizabeth Holmes’s fortune was estimated at
$4.5 billion in 2014,22 Theranos declined by 2020 to the point where it was
“dissolved with an assignment for the benefit of creditors,”23 while Holmes
is facing civil suits as well as criminal liability.24 In 2018, the United States
17. Id. at 23.
18. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 760 (E.D. La. 2011).
19. Alex Berenson, Merck Agrees to Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/business/09merck.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://
perma.cc/MEA6-PZPN].
20. For a detailed account of the Theranos affair from the journalist who uncovered it, see
generally JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILLICON VALLEY STARTUP
(2018).
21. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 218.
22. Id. at 213.
23. In re Arizona Theranos, Inc., Litig., No. 2:16-cv-2138-HRH, 2020 WL 5435299, at *1
(D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2020).
24. For a civil case, see generally In re Arizona Theranos, Inc., Litig., No. 2:16-cv-2138-HRH,
2020 WL 5435299, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2020), certifying several classes of plaintiffs pursuing RICO
claims, Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claims, California Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising
Law claims, and battery and medical battery claims against Theranos and Walgreens. For the criminal
litigation, see the main text.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint alleging
fraudulent conduct by Theranos in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act and the attendant Rule 10b-5, as well as
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act.25 Holmes eventually reached a
settlement with the SEC and agreed to pay a $500,000 penalty, to not serve
as a director or officer of a public company for ten years, and to return
Theranos shares that she had obtained during the fraud.26 But her troubles
were not over: in October 2020, a federal court in California denied Holmes
and her associate Ramesh Balwani’s motions to dismiss a federal indictment
alleging nine counts of wire fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud against both investors and patients.27 Holmes’s case eventually
went to trial in 2021, and a jury found her guilty of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud against Theranos investors and of three counts of wire fraud
connected to the investor defrauding scheme.28
The history of this disaster is instructive. Elizabeth Holmes formed
Theranos in 2003 as a “health care and life sciences company.”29 Holmes’s
goal was to develop a technology that could perform blood testing for a
wide variety of conditions30 using only a few drops of blood from a patient’s
finger. The blood was supposed to be collected in a “nanotainer” and then
immediately analyzed on Theranos’ devices back at Theranos’ labs.31
However, none of this materialized. The technology Theranos advertised
to investors and others was plagued by significant technical problems and
was impracticable at that stage of medical and engineering development.32
Instead of owning up to the failure of their technology, Holmes and Balwani
made numerous misstatements and misrepresentations to investors, as well
25. SEC v. Holmes, No. 5:18-cv-01602, Document 1, at 1, 3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018).
26. Press Release, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged with Massive Fraud,
SEC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41 [https://perma.cc/FBE2FEWF].
27. United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-cr-00258-EJD, 2020 WL 666563, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 11, 2020).
28. U.S. v. Elizabeth Holmes, et al., DOJ (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/
us-v-elizabeth-holmes-et-al [https://perma.cc/G8QV-8L45].
29. Holmes, 2020 WL 666563, at *1.
30. For instance, the technology was supposed to be able to test for vitamin D and B12 levels,
syphilis, hormones affecting testosterone levels, prostate cancer, and much more. CARREYROU, supra
note 20, at 95, 193–95. When preparing the partnership with Walgreens to have Theranos devices
installed in various Walgreens stores, the startup claimed that its devices could handle 192 different
blood tests. Id. at 129.
31. Holmes, 2020 WL 666563, at *1.
32. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 189–190, 195–200.
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as to doctors and patients, trying to market what they knew was nowhere
near as valuable as what they were claiming.33
For purposes of the following discussion, the significant aspect of
Theranos’ activities is that it endangered the health of patients and put them
at significant risk of bodily harm, although to a lesser extent than Merck.
For example, a Theranos blood test result sent to one patient showed an
abnormally high level of thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH).34 Since TSH
levels are inversely correlated with thyroxine (a thyroid hormone),35 these
results suggested that the patient needed to increase the dose of thyroid
medication she was taking.36 However, the patient’s doctor ordered a
second independent test from another company, the results of which came
back normal.37 In the doctor’s view, reliance on the Theranos results could
have proved disastrous, and increasing her thyroid medication could have
imperiled her pregnancy.38 In a similar case, Theranos reported wrong
potassium results for a patient who was on blood pressure-reducing
medication.39 Across a number of documented patients, the company’s
testing equipment routinely churned out either abnormally low or
abnormally high results for a variety of blood tests like calcium, potassium,
proteins, glucose, liver enzymes, cholesterol, and cortisol.40
The difference between how Merck and Theranos handled the safety of
the patients to whom their products were directed is mostly one of degree.
From an ethical perspective, it is clear that both companies did not take into
account the patients’ health to the extent they should have. But what were
the corporate lawyers doing all this time? It is to this issue that we now turn.
C. The Lawyers’ Role
In the Vioxx case, it is not clear how much Merck’s attorneys knew about
the cardiovascular risks of the drug before the 2004 withdrawal from the

33. Holmes, 2020 WL 666563, at *2–*3.
34. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 234.
35. Salman Razvi, Sindeep Bhana, Sanaa Mrabeti, Challenges in Interpreting Thyroid Stimulating
Hormone Results in the Diagnosis of Thyroid Dysfunction, J. THYROID RSCH., Volume 2019, at 1, 2.
36. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 234–35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id. at 231–37.
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market.41 Nevertheless, they were obviously aware of violations of the
FDA regulations that were mentioned in warning letters from the FDA,
since they had to respond to those letters.42 It is also clear that the legal
department had a lot of authority and control over the company’s
documents and communications.43 During the class action lawsuit filed by
patients against Merck, Judge Fallon in the Eastern District of Louisiana
remarked upon the wide range of activities that attorneys at Merck were
performing, many of which were not primarily for purposes of legal advice:
“[T]oo often we discovered lawyers inserting new paragraphs, introducing
references to different drugs, or eliminating entire sections of proposed
articles, reports, and presentations.”44 It appears, therefore, that Merck’s
in-house counsel might have been privy to potentially incriminating
documents, even though it is hardly possible after the fact to disentangle the
precise extent to which this was the case. The question remains as to what
the legal and moral responsibilities of in-house counsel would and should
have been in the event they had information concerning the dangerous
effects of Vioxx.
The conduct of lawyers employed by Theranos was also far from being a
model of ethical behavior. Boies, Schiller & Flexner, the firm hired by
Theranos to represent it, was well-known for its aggressive tactics.45
Among other things, Boies had private investigators conduct surveillance of
people that Holmes was planning to sue,46 intimidated people who had
leaked information about Theranos’ practices by threatening to bankrupt
their entire family or simply threatening to sue,47 and suggested that
compromising information about one of Holmes’ opponents would be
revealed if he did not agree to settle his patent claim with Theranos instead
of insisting on going to trial.48 As for the question of whether Theranos’
attorneys were aware that not all was well at the company, there is evidence
that some of them were at least willfully ignorant of the scientific practices
41. One of the crucial persons in Merck’s legal department was Joanne Lahner, Assistant
General Counsel at the time, in charge of Vioxx compliance. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 801, n.20 (E.D. La. 2007).
42. Id. at 802.
43. Thus, one court noted that Merck gave “the legal department the power of the corporate
executive.” Id. at 805.
44. Id. at 807.
45. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 133–34.
46. Id. at 133–35.
47. Id. at 247, 254–58.
48. Id. at 201–04.

2022]

Patients, Corporate Attorneys, and Moral Obligations

293

of Theranos. Thus, in a discussion with journalists from The Wall Street
Journal, David Boies and his lawyers were unwilling to answer basic
questions concerning whether the firm was using a Siemens commercial
blood analyzer and how many blood tests Theranos had performed on their
proprietary device, with one lawyer even lying about Theranos releasing
faulty potassium test results to patients.49 The overall attitude of the lawyers
during the meeting appears to have been one of aggressively defending what
they claimed to be Theranos’ trade secrets.50
As it became clearer that there was not much scientific support behind
Theranos’ technology, Boies and other attorneys did nothing to verify
whether their client’s blood testing methods could actually be harming
people, focusing instead on harassing former employees and pressuring
journalists not to publish the articles.51
The behavior exhibited by attorneys working for Merck and Theranos
seems to be typical of corporate counsel, especially in-house counsel.52
Corporations are intricate bureaucracies that do not incentivize lawyers to
question the dubious decisions of management.53 Lawyers’ attitudes
towards their own role within the corporation and their potential
responsibility to third parties outside the corporation appears to stem both
from a certain ideal of what is involved in being a lawyer, and from the way
large organizations themselves are structured. These two factors are
ordinarily intertwined and mutually reinforcing.54

49. Id. at 250–54.
50. Carreyrou, an eyewitness at the meeting, remarks: “We continued going around in circles,
never getting a straight answer about how many tests Theranos performed on the Edison [Theranos’
proprietary device] versus commercial analyzers. It was frustrating but also a sign that I was on the
right track. They wouldn’t be stonewalling if they had nothing to hide.” Id. at 250–54.
51. Id. at 254–55; see also Carliss N. Chatman, Myth of the Attorney Whistleblower, 72 SMU L. REV.
669, 712 (2019) (“Instead of working to ensure that Theranos complied with regulations and followed
corporate governance norms, its attorneys were deployed as a weapon against naysayers.”).
52. In the case of Theranos, Boies Schiller was the outside firm, but the relations between the
firm and Theranos were so close that the distinction between inside and outside counsel started to lose
its significance. For instance, Heather King, a partner at Boies Schiller, later became general counsel
at Theranos. CARREYROU, supra note 20, at 257. Likewise, David Boies was remunerated with
Theranos stock and later was appointed to the Theranos board of directors. Id. at 139, 279.
53. See Steven Vaughan & Emma Oakley, ‘Gorilla Exceptions’ and the Ethically Apathetic Corporate
Lawyer, 19 LEGAL ETHICS 50, 60–61 (2016) (discussing the notion of how corporate lawyers practice
“commerciali[z]ed professionalism” and are described as “cogs in a machine”).
54. See, e.g., id. at 62–64 (noting corporate lawyers’ responses to various hypotheticals,
evidencing that a number of lawyers were content with the fact that their client’s actions complied with
the law even though third parties were harmed). See also supra references in footnotes 51, 60, and 61.
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Thus, in a recent study, Steven Vaughan and Emma Oakley interviewed
fifty-seven corporate finance lawyers working for global law firms in
London.55 They found that most lawyers do not have a sense of
responsibility for the public good, except for idiosyncratic exceptions (e.g.,
some lawyers declared that they would not work for companies that
endangered the habitat of gorillas, while others singled out tobacco or
gambling companies).56 In general, lawyers preferred to distance
themselves from ethical responsibility, in large part based on the notion that
it is the client who is the ultimate decision maker, and the lawyer is only
there to execute the client’s wishes, even if wrong.57 This type of framing
of the lawyer’s responsibilities is what Gerald Postema called the “standard
conception” of the lawyer’s role.58 This standard conception is
characterized by the ideals of partisanship (whereby the lawyer’s
responsibility is solely to the client) and neutrality (meaning that the nature
of the client’s objectives or moral character are not the concern of the
lawyer, whose only job is to further the client’s aims).59
Commentators have noted that corporate culture itself contributes to
bolstering the values underlying the standard conception. In-house counsel,
for instance, depends on the corporation as its sole client for its livelihood
and financial incentives.60 Moreover, inside lawyers interact mostly with
non-lawyer members of the corporation and often have to make business
decisions and give advice on points of business, which leads them to identify
very closely with the corporation.61 Working for a company which is the
source of one’s revenue and with which one identifies creates an incentive
55. Id. at 50.
56. Id. at 66–67.
57. Id. at 63. Similar findings were reported after interviews with lawyers from England and
Wales by Moorhead and Hinchly. Richard Moorhead & Victoria Hinchly, Professional Minimalism?
The Ethical Consciousness of Commercial Lawyers, 42 J. L. & SOC’Y 387, 396–97 (2015). When asked to rank
the public interest, the client’s interest and their own or their firm’s interest, the answers of the
respondents in Moorhead and Hinchly’s study were consistent with the standard conception of
lawyering (as explained in the text): “Generally . . . client interests came unequivocally first.” Id. at 399.
Interestingly, however, in-house lawyers were a little more likely than lawyers in private practice to put
public interest first. Id. at 400.
58. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980).
59. Id.
60. Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive, Identity, and the Inherent Ethical Problem of In-House Counsel,
114 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 739–40 (2012).
61. Id. at 741–42. On the various identities that lawyers may adopt within a corporation, see
generally Sally Gunz & Hugh Gunz, Ethical Decision Making and the Employed Lawyer, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS
927 (2008).
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for lawyers to comply with the demands of management and co-workers in
order to thrive (or at the very least maintain their position) within the
company.62
Large corporations also tend to silo and embargo information, so that
lawyers often do not have the whole picture of what the company is doing.63
Elizabeth Holmes, for instance, approached the attorney issue “by not
consulting attorneys with the expertise to tell her no, siloing information
within her company, keeping in-house attorneys in the dark, and hiring
attorneys to advance defenses that were colorable[] only if the attorneys
lacked the information she kept siloed and embargoed.”64 That way she
could avail herself of lawyers throughout her fraudulent activities, while
terminating those who did not comply.65 This kind of corporate culture
encourages lawyers to shirk responsibility for their actions by simply
ignoring the unsavory aspects of the company’s business.66
II. THE MORAL QUESTION
Any account of the moral responsibility of attorneys in cases like Merck
and Theranos needs to answer two major questions: (1) Do attorneys
representing a company have a moral obligation towards third parties; and
(2) In case of an attorney’s conflict between a moral obligation to the
company and a moral obligation to a third party, which obligation should
prevail? In particular, the question is whether lawyers who are aware of
moral wrongdoing on the part of a company have an obligation to disclose
that wrongdoing to the authorities, and whether that obligation is stronger
than their obligations to their client. Note that the concern here is with the
moral obligations of lawyers, not with their legal obligations. The distinction
is intuitive and familiar. However, despite the amount of literature that has
been devoted to the ethical duties of lawyers, this crucial distinction
sometimes tends to be lost in the shuffle.
Consider, for example, Painter’s proposal of a voluntary whistleblowing
regime, according to which lawyers would be free to advertise their
disclosure policies to clients, and clients would be free to pick and choose

62. Jenoff, supra note 60, at 744–46.
63. Chatman, supra note 51, at 674–75.
64. Id. at 712 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 711.
66. For similar concerns about the position of inside counsel, see Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of
Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1001–34 (2005).
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the lawyers whose disclosure policy best suited the firm.67 In this scheme,
there would be no mandatory rule to disclose a client’s wrongdoing. If a
lawyer were to put a high price on morality and felt obligated to disclose
such wrongdoing in certain cases, he would make this clear to her client at
the start of the representation, and the client would be free to accept or
reject that lawyer. Painter acknowledges that there may be conflicts between
what he calls “common morality” and a lawyer’s “role morality,” but he
believes it is hopeless to impose one-size-fits-all ethical rules on the
profession.68 Lawyers should instead be allowed to choose whichever
disclosure policy they prefer.
But it is at least paradoxical to dismiss common morality in favor of a
voluntary whistleblowing regime, since common morality, presumably, tells
us the right thing to do. How can one claim that, although X is the right
thing to do, one should do Y instead where Y entails not doing X? Claims
that “enforcing a uniform rule is not always efficient in that benefits may
not always exceed costs”69 are not too helpful, since, assuming the uniform
rule implements the dictates of common morality, it is hard to see why a
cost-benefit analysis is relevant at all. Once common morality has spoken,
it is strange to appeal to any further considerations that might overturn its
verdict.
Of course, Painter could argue that lawyers’ moral obligations to third
parties (in case they exist) are only prima facie obligations and may be
potentially overridden by considerations of efficiency. Thus, all things
considered, lawyers would not have an obligation to disclose their client’s
wrongdoing, although prima facie they would. I will come back to this type
of reply, but let us note for now that on this way of rephrasing the view, it
is incorrect to speak as if morality requires one thing while efficiency
requires something else. The more precise way of stating the view would
be to say that morality ultimately does not require disclosure of the lawyer,
since morality includes considerations of efficiency (Painter’s common
morality might be, in that case, some sort of consequentialism).
The next two sections focus on the two main questions about the moral
responsibility of attorneys in medical companies.

67. Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 284 (1995).
68. Id. at 289–90.
69. Id. at 290.
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III. DO LAWYERS HAVE MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO THIRD PARTIES?
The cases we are considering involve companies (such as Merck and
Theranos) releasing products into the market that put patients at a
significant risk of death or bodily harm. As we will see, there is an obvious
and straightforward argument that attorneys who are knowledgeable of the
dangers posed to patients by their companies’ products have a moral
obligation to prevent harm to the patients.
Most commentators agree that lawyers have a duty to the public. In the
field of securities regulation, where the role of corporate attorneys has often
been scrutinized and criticized, scholars have recognized that public interest
needs to be taken into account when considering what lawyers’ obligations
are. As Harvey Golschmid pointed out, “[t]here is . . . a broad consensus
that lawyers should play a critical gatekeeping role in large public
corporations.”70 Congress itself took this position when it enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,71 pursuant to which the SEC adopted regulations
mandating up-the-ladder reporting of material violations of securities laws
and permitting external reporting to the SEC in certain circumstances.72
This view of the lawyer’s obligations extends, of course, to corporate lawyers
in general, and one often finds claims to that effect.73 Codes of professional
ethics also ordinarily include considerations of public interest.74
70. Harvey J. Goldschmid, A Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance: The Myth of Absolute
Confidentiality and the Complexity of the Counseling Task, 58 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 306, 309 (2003).
71. Id. at 309–10.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
73. See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues,
58 BUS. LAW 143, 176 (2002) (refuting some of the bar’s explanations for not creating stricter rules for
corporate lawyers); see also William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities
of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1454 (2006) (“The confusion around these issues
undermines the most fundamental claim of modem professionalism—that professionals can
simultaneously serve their client’s interests and the public’s interest.”).
74. In Breakey & Sampford, who discuss such codes, we find the following surprising claim:
“In all cases, the duty to the public good comes first, the client second, and the profession third.”
Hugh Breakey & Charles Sampford, Employed Professionals’ Ethical Responsibilities in Public Service and Private
Enterprise: Dilemma, Priority and Synthesis, 40 U.N.S.W. L.J. 262, 268 (2017). Judging by the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, this seems incorrect, as the client appears to be paramount therein.
In 1985, Harry Subin offered the following assessment: “The Model Rules represent the most radical
position yet assumed by the bar on the confidentiality issue, virtually eliminating an attorney’s right to
disclose client wrongdoing.” Harry I. Subin, Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1100 (1985). The Rules have changed to some extent since 1985, but
Subin’s comment is still not far from the truth. The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics were likely
closer to Breakey & Sampford’s description, as they specified that a lawyer “must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.” CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
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Interestingly, most of the time all these authorities simply assume that
corporate lawyers have some kind of obligation to the public, and that
therefore the lawyers’ duties to their client can be in conflict with the
mandates of morality.75 Perhaps it is simply obvious that these conflicts
can and do occur, and that is why the literature can afford to dispense with
argument. Be that as it may, at some point skeptics might wish to know
whether it is actually true that corporate lawyers need to concern themselves
with the effects of their clients’ actions on other parties. If their sole
obligation is to their clients, there would be no conflict to resolve.
Monroe Freedman, for instance, appears to take the view that lawyers do
not have any obligations whatsoever to parties other than their clients.
According to Freedman, the public interest itself is served by an adversary
system in which lawyers zealously serve and are answerable only to their
clients.76 Zealousness and confidentiality, for Freedman, are essential to
the adversary system, which in turn is at the foundation of a democracy that
values the dignity of the individual above all.77 As a general argument for
why lawyers should be limited to the role of serving their client, this will not
do. Insofar as Freedman does not stop to consider the dignity of persons
who are put in peril by corporate wrongdoing, it is far from clear that
Freedman’s picture of democracy is preferable to one where democracies
acknowledge people’s rights to be free from harm, even by weakening the
adversarial system.78 But even though Freedman’s argument is misguided,
it would still be worthwhile to offer a positive argument for why corporate
lawyers do have moral obligations to third parties, not just to their clients.
75. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 11 (1975)
(duty to public of lawyers involved in Watergate); David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the
Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1014 (1990) (suggesting
American legal system has always had two opposing views of ethics—(1) moral activist and
(2) partisan/nonaccountability); John T. Noonan Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of
Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (1966) (treating lawyers as extensions of the judicial
truth-finding function).
76. Monroe H. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, 2 J. LEGAL PROF.
47, 47 (1977).
77. Id. at 48.
78. Freedman does seem to make an exception for the kind of case with which we are concerned
here, as he would require a lawyer to reveal company information if the company were about to market
a lethal drug. Id. at 51. But he focuses on the criminal character of the company’s conduct, while I do
not insist on this characterization. Irrespective of whether a company’s conduct is criminal, a lawyer
has a moral obligation to prevent harm to other people. For further criticism of the adversary system
justification of lawyers’ moral neutrality, see generally David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse,
in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007).
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As it turns out, in the case of providers of medical products or services
there is an obvious and powerful argument that lawyers have moral
obligations to people other than their clients. The argument relies on the
familiar idea that whoever can prevent harm to someone at little cost to
themselves has a moral obligation to prevent that harm.79 Emergency
situations are typical examples: if a person is dying of thirst in the middle of
a desert and one happens to be driving by with sufficient water supplies, a
moral obligation arises to help the person in need. On most ethical theories,
and irrespective of the ultimate moral justification, this is the correct
result.80 Since corporate lawyers are sometimes in such emergency
situations, they have an obligation in those cases to prevent harm to third
parties (by reporting the danger, for example, to company management or
outside the company to regulatory agencies).
One may attempt to reply to this argument in several ways. Two such
replies are considered below and argued to be untenable.
A. No Duty to Rescue
One potential way to reject lawyers’ obligations to third parties in the
cases we are envisaging would be by relying on the idea that these cases
involve rescuing persons from the harm the companies’ products are
causing. Since there is no duty to rescue, the argument would be that lawyers
are under no obligation to rescue patients from harm. Let us assume, for
the sake of argument, that the cases we are concerned with are analogous to
rescue cases. There are two ways to understand this argument, as it could
be focusing either on a legal or a moral conception of a duty to rescue. If
we interpret it as being about a legal duty to rescue, the argument is beside
the point: the fact that there is no duty to rescue in tort or criminal law in
the United States does not show anything about lawyers’ moral obligations.
Thus, even supporters of the no-duty-to-rescue tradition acknowledge that
not rescuing someone from harm is the morally wrong thing to do.81
79. For a classic application of this idea, see generally Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality,
1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 229 (1972).
80. There many persons willing to reject the idea that there is any moral obligation in this case.
Presumably, the arguments in this essay will not be convincing to those who hold that view.
For example, one could conceivably hold that moral obligations can arise only from express contracts.
However, the onus is on these views to justify such a significant departure from widespread principles
of ordinary morality.
81. See Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American
Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (2008) (“The absence in American tort law of a duty to reasonably
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Therefore, to make this kind of argument would be to confuse legal
obligations with moral obligations.
But, even focusing on the legal question, the argument fails for other
reasons as well. For example, the no-duty-to-rescue rule has an exception
for cases in which someone takes charge of another who is in danger or
unable to protect themselves. In such a case, as the Restatement (Third) of
Torts points out, “[t]he actor has singled himself or herself out,”82 so that
their voluntary intervention justifies imposing a duty of reasonable care on
the voluntary rescuer.83
Now, owing to their particular line of business, medical companies and
their agents have arguably made themselves vulnerable to this exception.
Medical companies that sell products to patients are clearly holding
themselves out as being in the business of curing people, not harming them.
Contrast this with a company that sells securities to investors. The company
is not guaranteeing a profit to investors, and the best it can promise is loyalty
to the investors and honesty in its dealings.84 Investors will, therefore,
know that there is a risk associated with their investment. But there is
nothing comparable in the medical industry. A medical company, on the
face of it, sells products directed at curing various medical conditions. Every
medical product that is marketed to patients is supposed to make their life
better in some way. Patients have every reason to believe that the risks
associated with medications approved by federal agencies are not such as to
seriously endanger their health, and that known risks will be revealed and
considered by their medical providers. Because of these features of medical
companies, an argument could be constructed that under common law
principles, at the very least, agents of these companies (such as attorneys)
who (i) have knowledge of defective and dangerous products and (ii) have
contributed in some way to the marketing of these products cannot simply
stand by while patients are being harmed, as the agents share in the
responsibility of the company: they have incurred a duty of care towards
those patients by the very nature of the business they are representing.

aid a stranger in peril . . . utterly fails to accurately articulate our conventional sense of morality and
appropriate social behavior.”).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 44, cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2012).
83. Id.; see also Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J.
605, 613 (2001) (further discussing commission by omission).
84. In the case of companies that deal in highly risky financial products, the contrast is even
starker, given the obviousness of the market risks.
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Consequently, lawyers arguably have a legal duty to rescue patients at risk of
harm from defective medical products.85
What about the argument that lawyers have no moral duty to rescue
patients? Joel Feinberg has argued that one can be in a position to have
duties of rescue to total strangers if the situation requires one to help
another person in need. Feinberg’s goal is to reject certain views according
to which rescue situations should be conceptualized merely as conferrals of
gratuitous favors on persons in need of rescue and not as involving any
rights of those persons. To do so, Feinberg contrasts the case of a good
swimmer standing on a bridge who fails to save someone drowning in the
water below with the case of a governor who denies the last-minute appeal
to clemency of a murderer on death row.86 The distinction between these
two cases can be explained by the fact that one involves the assertion of
rights, whereas the other only involves a gratuitous favor. In the swimmer
case, the person drowning can be said to have a right to be saved, and the
swimmer a correlative duty to save him.87 But the governor is under no
duty to pardon the murderer, because the murderer has no right to demand
clemency.88 If the governor pardoned the murderer, that would be an act
of gratuitous favor, while the same cannot be said about the swimmer
situation.89
Feinberg’s argument is incomplete as it stands, because, although it
illustrates the distinction between rights and favors, it does not explain it.
The argument should be qualified by a doctrine of waiver of rights (or a
similar mechanism) in order to explain the intuition that the governor’s
pardon is indeed a gratuitous favor, and not a moral duty. Feinberg suggests
that the drowning person being a human being is enough to ground a duty
to rescue in the swimmer case.90 But that cannot be the whole story, since
the murderer is also a human being, and he does not have a right to be
85. Robert Schwartz has also suggested that the association between a lawyer and a particular
type of business represented may impose certain obligations on the lawyer: “[D]oesn’t the ethical health
lawyer have some obligation to advance the interests of those who need health care? Why else would
attorneys choose to practice health law?” Robert Schwartz, The Ethical Lawyer: When Doing the Right
Thing Means Breaking the Law—What is the Role of the Health Lawyer?, 34 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 624, 626
(2006).
86. Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 56,
60 (1984).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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pardoned. Neither is it sufficient to say that the murderer has waived his
right to be saved by committing the murder. For, in a case where this same
murderer was to escape and then inadvertently fall into a pond, a swimmer
passing by would arguably have a duty to rescue him. I believe the right
thing to say is that waiver of rights is relative to a context: one can waive
one’s right to be saved relative to one context, but not to another. The
murderer has waived his right to be saved in the judicial context, but not in
the drowning context. And the drowning victim in the swimmer case has
not waived her right to be saved at all (she would not have waived it even if
she had ended up in the water out of her own recklessness).
Thus, qualified with a doctrine of waiver, this argument can be deployed
to argue that lawyers working for medical companies have a moral
obligation to rescue patients at risk of harm. Since we have stipulated that
we are interested in cases where lawyers have knowledge of the dangers
posed by the companies’ products, these lawyers are in an analogous
position to the swimmer on the bridge in Feinberg’s example. Just like the
drowning person in Feinberg’s example, the patients who utilize the various
products released by companies, such as Merck and Theranos, have the right
to be saved by potential rescuers who are in a position to do so. Moreover,
just like the drowning victim and unlike the murderer in the judicial context,
these consumers have not waived their right to be saved. As the next section
will argue, since the harm to patients is too great compared to the
inconveniences that lawyers could suffer in these cases, there is no excuse
for not intervening.91
B. Actions, Omissions, and Causes
Another way to argue that lawyers have no duty to prevent harm to
patients focuses on the idea of omission. Since lawyers’ silence is not an
action, but only an omission to act, it might be claimed that lawyers
therefore do not incur any moral responsibility for that omission.
As a general claim about moral responsibility not being capable of arising
out of omissions, this argument is incorrect. Omissions liability is
91. I will not be discussing here the objection that the victims of corporate wrongdoing are
unknown or not sufficiently individualized. Let me just note that it is enough that some victims will
suffer harm as a result of corporate activity for the attorneys’ moral obligations to arise. It is irrelevant
who the victims are. A lot of the current regulatory regime in various areas of the law proceeds on the
same assumption, that harm to potential victims is a sufficiently serious concern for the government
to ban certain types of economic behavior. Securities laws and laws prohibiting various kinds of
activities resulting in environmental pollution are but two examples among many.
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recognized both by common morality and in the law. Suppose I promise A
that I will do X, and then I fail to do X, when in fact I would have been able
to do X. In that situation, I am clearly morally responsible for failing to
keep my promise. A legal example is Rule 10b-5 of the SEC, which explicitly
mentions omissions as a basis for securities fraud liability.92 If it is argued
that in these cases omissions give rise to moral or legal responsibility only
because there a prior duty to perform the action in question (a duty rooted
in the promise, or in the fraud regulations), then we are back to claiming
that in the corporate lawyer case there is no duty to act in order to prevent
harm to patients. If so, then the issue is no longer about omissions, but
about whether lawyers have a duty to act. This type of argument was
considered and rejected in the previous section.
But it might be argued that omissions cannot really give rise to moral
responsibility, perhaps on the theory that omissions do not cause anything,
and that one can be morally responsible only for what one causes.93 If so,
then the lawyers’ omission to act cannot be the cause of harm to patients,
and consequently the lawyers are not morally blameworthy.
To reject this kind of argument, it is sufficient to reject its second
assumption. Thus, even accepting that omissions are not causes, we can
point to the fact that our attributions of moral responsibility do not function
according to the principle that we are morally responsible only for what we
cause. The burden is on the proponent of that principle to adduce
arguments as to why the principle is true. The reason is that our judgments
of moral responsibility (e.g., we are, all else being equal, morally responsible
for promises we do not keep) are more robust than our confidence in an
abstract principle concerning the relation between morality and causation.
In the absence of any argument as to why the principle is true, it is more
rational to continue trusting our intuitions about what our moral obligations
are.
The first assumption of this argument, i.e., the idea that omissions cannot
be causes, fares no better. An omission by a corporate lawyer to prevent
92. “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
93. Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, STANFORD ENCYC.
PHIL. (July 7, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/#CausNotCausNotOccu
[https://perma.cc/GM4G-H25B].
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harm to third parties is clearly a cause in the ‘but for’ sense of causation:
if the omission had not occurred, the harm would not have occurred. Some
theorists, however, are dissatisfied with this account because it multiplies
causes beyond measure. Eric Mack, for instance, has argued that
non-occurrences are never causal factors, because we do not cite
non-occurrences in our causal explanations of various events, and because
including non-occurrences in our causal explanations would render what
were supposed to be sufficient conditions for an event to occur
insufficient.94 Mack uses the example of Jones, who fails to save Smith
from drowning.95 When we talk about the causes of Smith’s drowning,
we do not cite Jones not rescuing Smith among those causes.96 The reason,
according to Mack, is that there are a number of sufficient conditions for
Smith’s drowning that are identifiable as the causes, which would have led
to the drowning even in the absence of Jones’ non-rescuing.97 The view is
that, since these conditions are stipulated to be sufficient for Smith to drown
before Jones either acts or omits to act, Jones’ non-action cannot be a
necessary cause of Smith’s drowning, and therefore cannot be a cause of
Smith’s drowning.
However, Mack’s argument is open to question. The argument assumes
that isolating sufficient conditions for Smith’s drowning is unproblematic,
while that is not the case. Let us assume, for simplicity, that we have isolated
the fact that Smith does not know how to swim and the fact that he fell in
the water as sufficient to cause Smith’s death. On reflection, these
conditions are not really sufficient for Smith to drown. For example, if the
water were one-foot deep, Smith would not be drowning. So, we need to
add the fact that the water is deep among the sufficient conditions for
Smith’s drowning. But the augmented set of three conditions is still not
sufficient for Smith’s drowning. A host of other things need to obtain in
order for Smith to drown: the laws of physics need to hold, Smith’s
movements in the water have to cause him to submerge instead of keeping
him afloat (the latter could accidentally happen even if he does not know
how to swim), and so on. It does not look like there is a non-arbitrary way
of picking out sufficient conditions for Smith’s drowning.

94.
(1980).
95.
96.
97.

Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 230, 257–58
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id.
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This thought-experiment is, of course, an aspect of the well-known
distinction between causes and background conditions;98 when we pick out
causes among various events, we ordinarily keep some background
conditions fixed and do not call them “causes,” although in other contexts
they could be relevant.99 So, given the context-relativity of causal
attributions, and contrary to Mack’s argument, it is far from clear that we
will never cite non-occurrences as causes. In a context where Jones happens
to be passing by while Smith is drowning, we might very well consider that
Jones’ non-prevention of Smith’s drowning is a cause of the drowning, while
in a context where Jones is 1000 miles away at the moment that Smith is
drowning,100 we will be inclined to not include Jones’ nonfeasance among
the causes of the drowning. Arguably, the situation of corporate lawyers
who are aware of wrongdoing by the companies they work for is more
analogous to the former case than to the latter, so that attributing the status
of cause to lawyers’ non-actions is not out of the question.
To conclude this discussion, the omission argument against lawyers’
moral obligations to third parties fails, just as the no-duty-to-rescue
argument failed. Of the two arguments against lawyers’ duties to third
parties that we have considered, neither is workable.
It is important to note that, if the argument in this section is correct,
corporate lawyers sometimes have a moral obligation, and not merely the
permission, to prevent harm to third parties, such as patients who stand to
be harmed by a company’s medical products. The next question is whether
there are any countervailing considerations that may defeat this obligation,
in particular considerations related to lawyers’ professional obligations to
their corporate clients.
IV. PATIENTS’ RIGHTS AND WHY THEY ARE HARD TO OVERRIDE
There is something strange and prima facie inappropriate in asking whether
lawyers need to comply with their moral obligations. How is it possible that
98. See David Lewis, Causation, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 162 (1986) (explaining the
distinction between conditions and causes); cf. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW 11 (1959) (1959) (sing conceptions of causes in the justice system).
99. This problem is echoed in the legal distinction between “but for” causes and proximate
causes. See Mack, supra note 95, at 244–45 (detailing the difference between “but for” causation and
proximate causation).
100. See id. at 243 (explaining “[a]dvocates of the causation thesis insist that either omissions of
rescue activity or such omissions plus failures to engage in rescue activity are causally related to the
subsequent injuries which the rescue activities would have prevented—at least as causally necessary
conditions of those injuries”).
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lawyers would manage to avoid doing the right thing to do? Other members
of society do not seem to be able to take such vacations from morality,
so why are lawyers different?101
In the previous section, I have argued that there are situations in which
lawyers have moral obligations to third parties. But the argument, as it
stands, does not entail any general moral obligations of lawyers to not harm
other people. Lawyers, as a matter of course, whether in litigation or in
transactional work, often cause harm to other actors. For instance, by
providing legal advice to one company, a lawyer may cause the company’s
competitors to do worse and lose business. If, following Feinberg, we
conceive of harms as setbacks to interests,102 this kind of lawyer behavior
will constitute harm to the affected party. The question then becomes
whether we can square this routine and apparently morally unproblematic
causing of harm with the medical cases in which lawyers do have a duty to
not cause harm.
This issue can be resolved by observing that not all harms are wrongs.
When harming others in the ordinary course of business, lawyers do not at
the same time wrong those parties. To wrong someone, according to
Feinberg, is to indefensibly (unjustifiably and inexcusably) violate their
rights.103 When the competitors’ business does less well because of the
lawyer’s legal advice to a corporation’s management, the lawyer has not
violated any right of the competitor not to be harmed. In contrast, if the
argument in the previous section is correct, by not preventing harm to
patients in situations like the ones under discussion, lawyers do violate
patients’ rights, and thereby wrong them, in addition to harming them.
Consequently, although there is no general moral prohibition on lawyers’
causing harm to third parties, there is a moral prohibition on their wronging
third parties. The situations triggering this prohibition are the ones that

101. One may object that corporate officers are also in a position where they need to focus
most on profit, not on morality. That is correct, but morality cannot be entirely ignored even in that
context, as a corporation arguably has social responsibility obligations as well. What would be
particularly strange is if one social category, like lawyers, could completely ignore moral rules by
forwarding them to others.
102. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, in 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 33 (1984).
Harms in this sense are of course ubiquitous, and they are not restricted to lawyers or any specific
professions.
103. Id. at 34. One might adopt some other definition of wronging someone, but terminology
is not the issue. What matters is that the distinction between harms and wrongs is essential to
understanding why some harms are morally permissible while others are not.
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require a justification as to how and why lawyers are exempt from the
demands of morality.
The duties of loyalty and confidentiality to their client arise for lawyers as
a result of a contract with the client. But if lawyers sometimes have a moral
obligation to not harm third parties, their fiduciary duties arising out of a
contract with the client are too slender a basis to defeat that obligation.
Generally, one cannot contract around strict moral obligations, as is
evidenced by the fact that one cannot contract to intentionally kill innocent
people or perform other immoral acts.104 So, one problem for those who
want to defend the permissibility of lawyers withholding information from
patients in these cases is that there is no perspective outside of morality from
which one could argue for such a claim.105
Therefore, arguing that lawyers are exempt from the burdens of morality
requires some special sort of moral justification, perhaps in the form of an
argument that it is better for everyone if lawyers, sometimes, do not comply
with their prima facie moral obligations. To defeat the demands of prima facie
morality, this kind of argument would have to rest on two theses: (i) that
consequentialism is the right ethical theory; and (ii) that consequentialism
would mandate violating lawyers’ duties to third parties in the cases under
discussion. To be confident that (ii) is correct, one would have to adduce
empirical evidence that the amount of the consequentialist’s favored basic
good (happiness, pleasure, preference satisfaction, or whatever) is greater
society-wise if lawyers do not meet their obligations to third parties than if
they do.
So far, no empirical evidence to this effect has been uncovered.106 The
argument proceeds rather by pointing to the intuitive benefits of lawyers’
104. See Alistair Macleod, Moral Permissibility Constraints on Voluntary Obligations, 43 J. SOC. PHIL.
125 (2012) (arguing there are moral constraints on the generation of voluntary obligations). When
those moral constraints are violated, the voluntary actions undertaken (whether by contract, promise,
etc.) do not give rise to obligations. Richard Arneson rightly points out that “[o]ne is not morally
obligated to help one’s friend if doing so would violate a moral requirement such as the requirement
to report illegal activity to the police or the requirement to refrain from aiding and abetting persons
who are initiating a course of action that would wrongfully violate the significant rights of other
persons.” Richard Arneson, Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality, 86 MONIST 382, 397 (2003).
105. It would be possible to argue that legal permissibility is sufficient for the lawyers’ activities
and concede that what lawyers do is immoral. I know no theorist willing to go that far.
106. Counting and comparing the amount of happiness or any other kind of state over multiple
subjects is notoriously difficult, which is a serious obstacle to any consequentialist defense along the
lines presented in the main text. As a first approximation, one could compare the rough number of
lives saved in states or countries that impose and enforce legal obligations on lawyers to prevent harm
to third parties to the number of lives lost in jurisdictions that do not. But a full statistical analysis of
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loyalty to their clients, which are supposed to outweigh their moral
obligations to third parties. But, for the cases with which we are concerned
here, namely cases in which people’s lives and health are at stake, it is likely
that the argument for lawyers’ non-intervention will fail even on
consequentialist terms.
One of the reasons to be skeptical of generalized consequentialist claims
about the all-things-considered right thing to do is that any plausible
consequentialist theory will need to take into account the rights of the
parties involved. The more serious the rights involved, the less convincing
will be the claim that those rights will be outweighed by other
considerations. Rights are very robust moral considerations, so that
ordinarily the justification for violating or infringing people’s rights must
meet an extremely high bar. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has argued that
rights function as trumps over considerations having to do with overall
social utility.107 But even were rights not to function in all instances as
trumps over utility, it is hardly plausible that in the medical cases that are the
focus of this particular discussion patients’ rights could be outweighed by
other considerations. Especially when harms to patients are known
(as opposed to speculative) and serious (as opposed to de minimis), overriding
patients’ rights is going to be hard to justify.
What rights are at stake in cases of medical companies releasing
potentially dangerous products on the market? Patients’ rights can be
formulated in a variety of ways, for instance as rights to be free from bodily
harm, rights not to be harmed, rights not to be killed, or as rights to life.
Martha Nussbaum, for example, has included bodily health and bodily
integrity among the central human capabilities essential for a life with
dignity.108 The right to life is widely acknowledged as one of the
these types of laws in terms of their impact on happiness, preference satisfaction, etc. would obviously
have to take into consideration a lot more parameters than just the number of lives saved or lost, and
to make several non-obvious assumptions about what happiness or preference satisfaction are and how
to measure them. The final analysis is bound to be extremely complex, and the results very likely
controversial. See Marc Fleurbaey’s Economic Theories of Justice, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 665 (2019)
(discussing some related open questions in economic theory). For one mathematically sophisticated
account of the feasibility of interpersonal comparisons of well-being, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER,
WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION 57–153 (2012).
107. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY191(1978); Ronald Dworkin, Is There a
Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 199–212 (1981); cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 187 (1996) (“[I]t is neither possible nor just to allow all conceptions of the good to be
pursued (some involve the violation of basic rights and liberties).”).
108. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 75–76 (2007). Nussbaum is interested in these capabilities as a foundation for an
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fundamental human rights, for instance in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.109 Some hold that the right not to be killed is such that it
cannot be infringed no matter what we put in the consequentialist
balance.110 For our purposes, it is immaterial on which formulation of
patients’ rights we settle. The significant fact is that these are all very
important rights. Companies like Merck and Theranos, through their
actions, have violated one or several of them. For the purposes of this
discussion, I will be proceeding on the commonly accepted assumption that
patients, and people in general, do have such fundamental rights to be free
from harm, or at least from unjustifiable harm.111
Given the serious character of these rights, what can the consequentialist
place in the balance? It is instructive to consider what types of cases are
usually discussed in connection with the potential permissibility of
infringing the right to be free from bodily harm or the right not to be killed,
as these will provide us with a useful comparison class to be contrasted with
the case of corporate lawyers and patients at risk of injury.
One important class of cases that both common morality and the law
recognize is constituted by cases of self-defense.112 Apart from
self-defense, putative examples of the permissibility of infringing people’s
fundamental rights that are sometimes put forth are so-called ‘trolley
problem’ cases. These hypothetical scenarios are meant to test our moral
intuitions about the permissibility of killing or letting someone die.
For instance, is it morally permissible for someone who is driving an
unstoppable trolley to steer the trolley away from a track that contains five
people and onto a track that only has one person on it, given that those are
the only two options and either one or five people are stipulated to die,

account of social justice. Id. This essay is focused on the narrower question of whether there is any
plausible justification for lawyers infringing these rights.
109. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
110. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 168 (1990) (calling such rights
“maximally stringent claims”). Following Thomson, I will be using the term “infringe” (in connection
with rights) to denote an encroachment on a right that need not be at the same time morally wrong (as
opposed to violations of rights, which are moral wrongs). Id. at 122.
111. Re’em Segev, Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 383,
436–37 (2005); see also THOMSON, supra note 111, at 228–48 (providing a defense of the strong view
that people have a right not to be caused harm simpliciter).
112. These cases can be conceptualized as situations where the attacker waives their rights to
be free from harm, so they may not be genuine cases where it is permissible to infringe people’s rights
after all.
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depending on the driver’s choice?113 Many consequentialists (but not
exclusively) will say it is permissible to kill one person in this context in order
to save five. Sundry examples have been produced in the literature to test
the boundaries of moral permissibility in similar instances. For instance,
why does it seem permissible for someone to kick another person in the
shin in order to save five lives, but it does not seem permissible for a surgeon
to cut up a person and distribute their organs to five people, thereby saving
five lives?114
We do not need to wade through all the intricacies of these questions
here. For our purposes, we need only note the kinds of reasons that might
justify infringing someone’s right to life or right not to be harmed. These
countervailing reasons have to do in each instance not only with competing
interests of other people, but with similarly stringent interests. One is
seldom worried about the question whether a person’s right not to be
harmed can be infringed just so a million other persons can enjoy their
morning coffee. For fundamental rights to be permissibly infringed (if at
all), sufficiently weighty reasons are required. That is what makes trolley
problems hard cases; however one proposes to ultimately solve them. Bona
fide hard cases are frequent in the legal domain as well. As one commentator
observed, a securities lawyer may be faced with the question of what action
to take in a case where there is a 50% chance that a certain public disclosure
is legally required.115 Given the complexity of federal securities regulations,
it may just not be clear what the answer is in such a case.
In contrast, it does not look like lawyers’ professional relationship to their
clients is sufficiently weighty to overcome the demands of morality in the
medical cases at issue here. The nature of the cases is actually such that they
could not be hard cases at all. The clients (Merck, Theranos and others) are
corporations, and corporations do not have a right to bodily integrity or a
right to life. Even on a consequentialist view, there is nothing as significant
as the patients’ rights to put in the balance. That is why Merck and Theranos
are easy cases.
Of course, what makes these cases easy is the egregious character of the
facts in each. However, not all cases will be so clear. Since typically any drug
and many medical products that legally enter the stream of commerce have
113. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV.
1, 2–3 (1967) (applying a hypothetical to explain the doctrine of the double effect).
114. THOMSON, supra note 111, at 149–50.
115. Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics,
76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 467 (1978).
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side effects, some of them lethal, there arises the question at what point the
corporate lawyers’ moral obligations to third parties are triggered. There is
no precise answer to this question. Some cases will be obvious, others will
require lawyers to balance various considerations. I suggest that the
materiality standard adopted by the SEC and by the courts in the context of
security fraud would be helpful here as well. In Basic Incorporated v.
Levinson,116 the Supreme Court held that “[a]n omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote[,]”117 and further clarified that for a
fact to be material, “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”118 This test of materiality is suitable to the medical context
precisely because it focuses on the impact of the information on patients
and thereby respects their autonomous choice whether to use a product or
not.
According to this standard, a lawyer would incur moral obligations to
patients at risk of harm when the information about the drug or product is
material in the sense of Levinson. In medical cases, we would be asking
whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would be
affected in their medical choices by the information that is being withheld
from the public. Information that is already publicly available about drugs’
side effects and other potential problems that are publicly known will not
be subject to this test of materiality. But with other kinds of information
that lawyers may come across, they will have to make a decision as to
whether the harm to patients is serious enough to warrant further action.
I have claimed that, in easy cases like Merck and Theranos, once moral
obligations to third parties are triggered, it is unlikely that a consequentialist
calculus could yield the conclusion that lawyers’ professional obligations
could override patients’ rights. In response, one might try to argue that we
need to consider the rights of everyone involved with the corporation, such
as shareholders, employees, directors, and maybe even outside entities like
creditors or contractors. Perhaps accounting for the interests of all these
people would justify the lawyers’ silence about the companies’ dangerous
products. There are several replies to this objection. First, given the
116. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
117. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
118. Id. at 231–32.
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stringency of the patients’ right to life and/or right not to be harmed, it is
implausible to say that adding up a multitude of lesser rights could result in
the permissibility of infringement. It is also implausible to claim that the
companies’ employees or contractors have a right that information about
the companies’ products cannot be revealed. How would they have
acquired such a right in the first place?
Second, on consequentialist grounds there is no need to limit the relevant
parties to persons who stand to benefit monetarily from the corporation.
The result of the consequentialist calculus is, therefore, not certain to yield
a verdict of non-disclosure. In this connection, the Business Roundtable
recently issued corporate guidelines according to which a company should
take into account a variety of stakeholders when making decisions:
“customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.”119
Accordingly, lawyers would also have to take all these constituencies into
account when deciding what to do.120 But nothing guarantees that, when
adding customers and communities to the consequentialist mix, the verdict
would be non-disclosure. Rather the opposite.
Third, and irrespective of the new Business Roundtable guidelines, it is
far from clear that corporate lawyers actually do need to think about all the
parties involved in some way with the corporation when deciding what to
do. And in fact, scholars who would likely advise non-disclosure in these
circumstances have relied not on any consequentialist number crunching,
but on a principled argument from lawyers’ responsibilities to their
clients, foremost among them being the duty of confidentiality.121
This justification will be examined in the next section.
119. John Levin, The Lawyer’s Role Under the New Corporate Guidelines, 34 CBA REC. 42, 42 (2020).
120. Id. It is true that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to the company, and not to other
constituencies. To that extent, the claims of the company may receive a greater weight in the rights
calculation envisioned in the main text. But lawyers’ fiduciary duties cannot be decisive at this point
in the dialectic. If the argument is that lawyers need not disclose because of consequentialist
calculations, fiduciary duties will enter the calculations merely as one further consideration, perhaps
with an extra weight. An argument that fiduciary duties will defeat any third-party claim from the
get-go in virtue of their nature as fiduciary duties is a different kind of argument than the one under
consideration here. Arguments for why the duty of confidentiality is special in this way are addressed
in the next section. See discussion infra Part V.
121. Abe Krash, Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?,
55 CHI. B. REC. 31, 31 (1974); Stephen J. Friedman, Limitations on the Corporate Lawyer’s and Law Firm’s
Freedom to Serve the Public Interest, 33 BUS. LAW. 1475, 1484 (1978); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RSCH. J. 613, 629
(1986); Stephen Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 331, 334 (1998) [hereinafter
Pepper, Why Confidentiality?]; Freedman, supra note 76, at 50.
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V. CONFIDENTIALITY
The relevant confidentiality provisions and disclosure regime for the
corporate lawyer are contained in Rules 1.6 and 1.13 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.122 Rule 1.6 is the general confidentiality
provision, and paragraph (a) states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
permitted by paragraph (b).123

Relevant for our purposes, paragraph (b) permits, but does not require,
the lawyer to reveal confidential information in order “to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm.”124
Rule 1.13 concerns lawyers that represent organizations. After making it
clear that corporate lawyers represent the organization (as opposed to its
constituents), the Rule mandates that a lawyer who knows that a person
associated with the organization is violating his or her legal obligation to the
organization or violating some other law where that violation could be
imputed to the organization is to “proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization.”125 The Rule further specifies that, unless
the lawyer reasonably believes it is not necessary to report this misconduct,
the lawyer is in fact obligated to refer the matter higher up the organizational
ladder, including potentially to the highest authority in the organization.126
If the highest authority does not rectify the situation, and continues on a
course of conduct that is “clearly a violation of law,” then the corporate
lawyer, to the extent he or she “reasonably believes that the violations
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,” may,
but need not, disclose confidential information.127
122. Almost all states have adopted some version of these rules. See Alphabetical List of
Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model
_rules/ [https://perma.cc/HU3X-8XGS] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) (listing the date when each state
adopted the Model Rules); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2021); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13.
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
124. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1).
125. Id. at R. 1.13(b).
126. Id.
127. Id. at R. 1.13(c).
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A lawyer who does not observe these rules may be subject to discipline
by the bar in the state where they practice. But why do codes of ethics
include confidentiality rules, and why do lawyers and clients need them?
Confidentiality rules have been justified in the abstract by reference to the
essential role they play in the adversary system of justice and ultimately in
democratic societies,128 or by relying on the idea that confidentiality is
necessary for an effective representation of the client.129 Both of these
justifications of confidentiality have serious problems. The following
subsections will take a brief look at each.
A. The Adversary System, Democracy, and Justice
Insofar as we rely on the value of confidentiality to the overall adversary
system, we need an explanation for why anyone should care about the
adversary system in the first place. Any plausible answer to that question
will involve some kind of argument that the adversary system is an essential
part of a legitimate democratic system130 that, as a matter of fairness and
the democratic process, any person is entitled to know what the law says
about his or her conduct without placing him or herself at risk of harm for
so doing131 or some similar argument to the same or similar effect.
The problem with this answer, as mentioned already in Section III, is that
from the point of view of the political system in its entirety, third parties’
rights, and especially important rights such as the right to life or the right
not to be harmed, count just as much (if not more) than the rights of lawyers
and their clients.132 So, it is hardly coherent to justify a privilege for the
adversary system on grounds of fairness or the value of the democratic
system when that involves leaving out other constituencies that are also an
essential part of a democratic society.
A further and fundamental mistake of this approach to justifying
confidentiality is to assume that, once a social practice (such as
128. See Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, supra note 122, at 334 (detailing the need for lawyers and
their duty of confidentiality in a complex society); see also Freedman, supra note 76, at 50 (explaining
how lawyers are servants to their clients, rather than the clients’ masters in a democratic society).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (“A fundamental principle in the
client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not
reveal information relating to the representation).
130. See Freedman, supra note 76, at 47 (noting the adversary system in society is the highest
point of public interest).
131. See Pepper, Why Confidentiality?, supra note 122, at 336 (suggesting one ought to have the
opportunity to “know the law which governs [his or her] conduct”).
132. See supra Section III (discussing a lawyer’s obligations to third parties).
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confidentiality) is justified as a matter of general principle, it is inviolable.
But that is incorrect, since any policy or principle is subject to exceptions. It
is well-known that laws have an open texture, in that they cannot
countenance all the particulars of each case they will be applied to.133
Therefore, sometimes exceptions to the rule of law arise that have to be
dealt with.134 The same is true of all social practices, not just legal practice.
As H.L.A. Hart pointed out, the rule prohibiting breaking a promise may be
broken in certain circumstances.135 Hence, for the corporate lawyer faced
with potential violations of moral obligations by their client and with duties
to third parties, it is small comfort to be told that the rule of client
confidentiality can be justified in the abstract as good for democracy (or
some similar justification). The lawyer wants to know what to do in his or
her particular situation, and relying blindly on an immutable confidentiality
rule is not always going to yield the morally right result because the particular
case may just be one of the exceptional circumstances.136 In cases like
Merck and Theranos, not only are the situations exceptional because of the
stringency of third parties’ rights involved, but it is easy to see that they are
exceptional because of the egregiousness of corporate conduct.
Frederick Schauer has observed that, if we justify legal rules based on
considerations of justice or equity, it is actually misleading to speak of
exceptions to those rules in particular cases:
For if a rule will be applied only when it is consistent with justice, then it turns
out once again that talk of exceptions, or of the power to create them, is largely
distracting. The power to create an exception to a rule when required by
justice is equivalent to the power to do justice simpliciter.137

If Schauer is right, and if we insist on justifying confidentiality by
something like its role in the democratic system (or similar ideas), then cases
in which patients’ rights are violated by medical companies are not even
exceptions to the confidentiality rules, but cases that straightforwardly
mandate the lawyer to apply fundamental principles of democracy or justice
133. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
134. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 871 (1991) (“Exceptions to
statutes, regulations, common law rules, and constitutional tests are of course everywhere in the
law . . . .”).
135. Hart, supra note 134, at 139.
136. Cf. J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344, 348–49 (1956)
(critiquing rule utilitarianism).
137. Schauer, supra note 135, at 895.
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directly to his particular case, which entails taking patients’ rights into
account from the get-go. On this view, all the work is done ultimately by
the principles that are said to underlie confidentiality, and not by
confidentiality as such. We are therefore brought back, by a different route,
to the idea that a theory that seeks to justify confidentiality on the basis of
higher political or ethical principles is ultimately self-undermining, since by
its own lights it will have to consider stakeholders other than solely the
lawyer’s client. The ultimate principles that are held to justify confidentiality
will turn out to not support a view of confidentiality that consists only in
loyalty to the client to the exclusion of everyone else. It is actually hard to
see how principles of democracy or justice could possibly yield any other
kind of result.
B. Confidentiality Rules and the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Confidentiality rules are often justified based on the utility of
confidentiality to clients and lawyers, without essential reliance on any
higher-order social or political justification. One can spell out this
traditional view in various ways. Following Deborah Rhode, we can say that
this type of justification boils down to two main ideas: “first, that any risk
of disclosure would deter clients from freely confiding in counsel; and
second, that the costs of such a chill on clients’ access to legal assistance
would outweigh any societal benefits.”138
Before taking up the question whether this view of confidentiality is
correct, it is worth pointing out that although the concept of confidentiality
is nowadays taken for granted in the practice of law (to the extent that the
practice would look unimaginable without it to most lawyers), this concept
is far from being an a-historical given, let alone anything analytic in the idea
of law practice itself. As recent scholarship has shown, confidentiality as we
know it today is a relatively recent development. Ray Patterson has adduced
convincing evidence that a shift toward loyalty to the client as the lawyer’s
primary duty (to the detriment of the duty of candor to the court and of a
duty of fairness to third parties) occurred in the second half of the
19th century.139 In the earlier half of the 19th century, lawyers’ duties to
their clients were just as important as their duties to others.140 Early
138. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 613 (1985).
139. L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L. J. 909, 912
(1980).
140. Id.
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authorities on legal ethics, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood,
did not even consider confidentiality to be an ethical duty of the lawyer and
did not dwell much on the topic (Hoffman did not address it at all).141 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 1845 case,142 deemed it “a popular, but
gross mistake” to suppose that a lawyer owes fidelity solely to her client.143
Confidentiality made its first appearance in a code of ethics in Alabama in
1887.144 Since then, it has been a staple throughout the Canons of
Professional Ethics, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and all
the way up to the contemporary Model Rules. According to Patterson, once
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client became prominent in the
19th century, it was inevitable that confidentiality, as one aspect of the duty
of loyalty, would follow quickly along.145 On Patterson’s analysis,
confidentiality underwent a transformation from initially being just a right
of the client as part of the attorney–client privilege to being “a moral
obligation of the lawyer.”146 Consequently, one of the main reasons why
this new idea of confidentiality as the lawyer’s duty became successful over
time is that lawyers found it convenient to evade responsibility to third
parties by using their duty of confidentiality as a protective shield.147
Lloyd Snyder has also noted that “[c]onfidentiality, as a rule of
professional ethics, is of recent origin.”148 Snyder places the first
unequivocal formulation of a duty to preserve a client’s confidences in 1937,
when the ABA clarified the 1927 version of Canon 37 of the
1908 Canons.149 As Snyder notes, for 400 years the desideratum that the
client is to be forthcoming with their lawyer had only justified the
evidentiary attorney–client privilege, but by “the middle of the 20th century,
for some unstated reason, the same rationale required that attorneys
withhold disclosure of an expanded inventory of information.”150
The fact that confidentiality as currently understood has a history should
not be insignificant to those who try to place it on a pedestal, as the
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
479 (2002).
149.
150.

Id. at 914, 941.
Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845).
Patterson, supra note 140, at 928 (quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845)).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 914–15.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 915–16, 958.
Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477,
Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 491.
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lackluster pedigree of the concept shows that the practice of law seemingly
survived for most of history without it.
But apart from this historical caveat, the idea that confidentiality is
essential to the lawyer-client relationship because it encourages clients to
utilize legal services and to be straightforward with their lawyers is
questionable. An initial difficulty is that clients may not have a precise
knowledge or understanding of confidentiality rules. In the late 1980s,
Fred Zacharias conducted an empirical survey of sixty-three attorneys and
105 lay persons in Tompkins County (New York) which suggested, among
other things, that what drives client behavior is general trust in lawyers, not
the strict confidentiality regime mandated by the rules.151 While Zacharias’
study is inapplicable to sophisticated corporate clients, it does tend to show
that the contribution of confidentiality rules to client candor is not as strong
as proponents of the traditional justification of confidentiality have
supposed.152
Of more relevance to the corporate context is the observation that clients
need lawyers in many instances because of the complexity of the legal issues
that they face.153 In such circumstances, it may be sufficient for the lawyers
to ask for all the relevant information (without any promise of
confidentiality) for the client to be sincere.154 In many cases, and in
particular in commercial transactions, confidentiality may be superfluous,
because if the client is not sincere with their attorney, the client would not
be able to achieve their goals.155
Moreover, and as Daniel Fischel has argued, confidentiality rules come
with their own costs to the entire judicial system.156 Since decision makers
(e.g., judges or juries) do not receive an independent assessment of a case,
but instead two opposed partisan views filtered through the lens of the
parties’ attorneys, the decision process incurs costs associated with arriving
at the truth.157 In this system, confidentiality makes it harder for parties
with nothing to hide to distinguish themselves from parties who rely on
151. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 379, 386 (1989).
152. Id. at 396.
153. See Subin, supra note 74, at 1163 (contemplating the intuition that “most clients feel the
need for professional legal services to help them with the complexities of [the American] legal system”).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1163–64; see also Samuel D. Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that
Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 9 (1980) (noting it may be in the best interest of most clients
to converse freely with their attorneys).
156. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998).
157. Id. at 18–19.
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confidentiality to dissimulate.158 Parties who have nothing to hide will
therefore spend more resources in order to distinguish themselves, and
decision makers will have to expend more effort in finding out who is
right.159 On the whole, the benefits of confidentiality to the class of clients
in its totality tend to balance out, so that there is no net gain.160 In fact,
according to Fischel, it is mostly the legal profession, and not society as a
whole, who stands to benefit from strict confidentiality rules, because such
rules increase the cost of legal services.161
We have so far looked at some of the criticism that has been leveled at
the idea that confidentiality rules are essential to the lawyer-client
relationship. But, even supposing that this justification of confidentiality
was actually empirically sound, a strict confidentiality regime such as the one
currently on the books is bound to succumb to the problem of exceptions,
which affected the broader political justification of confidentiality as well.
Hard and fast confidentiality rules have been criticized precisely from the
perspective that in certain cases, they reach morally incorrect results and
prevent people at risk of harm from obtaining necessary help.162
It is to be emphasized again that some cases in the medical company
context will be easy, so that it will be very clear what the moral obligations
of attorneys are. In those cases, the fact that confidentiality can perhaps be
justified as a policy cannot outweigh the urgency of the attorneys’ ethical
obligations to third parties at risk. The morally obvious character of
situations where people’s lives are at stake has been noted by commentators
more than once. Consider the infamous case of Spaulding v. Zimmerman.163
In Spaulding, the plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant’s car, suffered injuries
as a result of a collision between the defendant’s car and another vehicle.164
The defendant’s lawyer later came to have knowledge that the plaintiff had
an aorta aneurism (which might have been caused by the car accident), while

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 18.
161. Id. at 3; cf. Subin, supra note 74, at 1154 (remarking ironically: “it is ethically inappropriate
for the Model Rules to protect attorneys from wrongful actions of the client while protecting no one
else—except, of course, the prospective victims of that commonly encountered client, the homicidal
maniac”).
162. Subin, supra note 74, at 1164; Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and
Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 78 (1998).
163. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
164. Id. at 348.
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the plaintiff himself was not aware of this condition.165 The defendant’s
attorney did not disclose to the plaintiff that he had a life-threatening
condition, and the case settled.166 In a discussion of Spaulding, Roger
Cramton and Lori Knowles note that “[g]iven agreement about the primacy
of human life as a value, the moral issue in Spaulding should be an easy one
for lay people and moral philosophers alike.”167
In Spaulding, the plaintiff to whom the lawyer owed a moral duty of
disclosure was a readily identifiable person, which perhaps makes the case
even more egregious than that of corporate attorneys working for medical
companies, where the patients who are at risk of harm are ordinarily not
known in advance to the lawyer (or anyone else). But even in the latter case,
the moral obligation to prevent harm at low cost to oneself is the same,
because it is grounded in patients’ right to life or the right not to be harmed,
just like the defendant’s lawyer in Spaulding had an obligation to tell the
plaintiff that he was in danger because the plaintiff had a right to life. The
fact that corporate lawyers cannot specifically name the people who will be
affected by a company’s medical products is morally irrelevant.168
As a matter of principle, it would be disingenuous to argue that potential
victims of corporate harm cannot be protected by disclosure rules because
these victims are a non-identifiable amorphous mass. This objection makes
little sense in the corporate context precisely because the corporate client is
just as amorphous as the potential victims. If the non-identifiable character
of the victims is sufficient to avoid lawyers’ legal or moral obligations to
them, how is it that the abstract notion of the corporation is a sufficiently
identifiable subject of the lawyers’ confidentiality obligations?
This interpretation is borne out by the scant, but very pertinent, case law
on the topic. Thus, in Balla v. Gambro,169 the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the death or serious bodily injury exception applies in a case where a
lawyer disclosed information about his employer company’s purchase (with
intent to sell) non-FDA-compliant dialyzers.170 The court recognized that
Rule 1.6 protected “the lives and property of citizens,” and, deeming that
165. Id. at 349-50.
166. Id. at 350.
167. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 163, at 87.
168. Cf. Matthew K. Wynia, Breaching Confidentiality to Protect the Public: Evolving Standards of Medical
Confidentiality for Military Detainees, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS, 1, 2 (2007) (“[I]s being ‘identifiable’ a morally
legitimate basis for getting extra attention?”).
169. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
170. Id. at 109, 112–13.
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the seizure by the FDA of the dialyzers showed that their use would cause
death or serious bodily injury, held that the lawyer was required by Rule 1.6
to disclose information about the purchase.171 The court was not
concerned that the potential victims of the defective dialyzers were
unknown at the time of the purchase. It correctly deemed this to be
irrelevant to its decision.
A comparison between attorneys and other professions in which
confidentiality is highly valued tends to confirm the conclusion that lawyers
should be subject to mandatory disclosure obligations in some
circumstances. Other professions have mandatory reporting obligations in
certain situations. Medical personnel have duties to reveal confidential
information to protect third parties from harm, and sometimes legal
obligations to report in order to protect the public (for instance, duties to
report child abuse, gunshot wounds, or certain kinds of diseases).172
Likewise, courts have sometimes recognized a duty for psychiatrists to
reveal confidential information about their client when the client is a threat
to another person.173 Public accountants, under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, have to implement procedures to detect
illegality when performing company audits. If they discover anything illegal,
they have to report up the ladder to management and to the board of
directors; and in case the board does not disclose to the SEC, the
accountants are required to report to the SEC themselves.174 Given these
precedents, it is not clear why lawyers should be excepted from mandatory
disclosure rules. As we shall see shortly, some states actually do require
disclosure in their confidentiality provisions.
VI. STEPS FORWARD
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits an attorney to disclose confidential
information to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
If the arguments in the previous sections are correct, the Rule does not go
far enough. I have argued that lawyers are under a moral obligation to
prevent harm to third parties when doing so comes at little cost to
themselves.
Since this obligation is not outweighed by lawyers’
171. Id. at 108–09.
172. Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A Philosophically Informed and
Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1985).
173. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976).
174. Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a
Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 255 (1996).
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confidentiality obligations to clients, the Model Rules should reflect that fact
and require (not merely permit) lawyer disclosure in cases of potentially
serious bodily harm. This conclusion is not novel among advocates of the
rights of the public as against misconduct of lawyers’ clients.175 The
preceding arguments are restricted to cases of serious physical harm caused
by medical companies, and it remains to be seen whether the same kinds of
argument would justify lawyer disclosures in other contexts, such as various
kinds of commercial activities that pose risks of harm to third parties.176
Certain states have already adopted confidentiality exceptions that
conform to an adequate moral standard. For instance, Rule 1.6(c) of the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct states: “A lawyer shall reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.”177 Similar provisions appear, for example, in the
Rules of Professional Conduct of Washington State and of Iowa.178 The
language of “substantial bodily harm” is sufficiently broad to capture cases
like Vioxx and Theranos. The 1998 internal study conducted by Merck
showed a much higher risk of heart problems for patients taking Vioxx than
patients using other sorts of arthritis medication. On any reasonable
account of what constitutes “substantial bodily harm,” an increased risk of
cardiovascular events will qualify. Similarly, reporting incorrect blood test
results to patients, as Theranos did, can have serious consequences for their
health, because patients rely on blood tests to make decisions about other
medications they are taking, the diet they are on, medical procedures they
decide to undergo, and so on.
Some states condition lawyer disclosure on the criminality of the client’s
conduct. Thus, the corresponding Arizona rule states: “A lawyer shall reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is

175. See e.g., Subin, supra note 74, at 1172–73(“[A]n attorney should have a legal duty to disclose
information obtained during the course of representation in order to prevent serious harm.”).
176. I believe that similar arguments would actually apply to those cases as well. In order to
avoid certain kinds of complexities and focus on the basic moral arguments; however, the view
advocated in this paper is restricted to what I have called “easy” cases.
177. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (emphasis added).
178. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 32:1.6(c). The ABA provides a state-by-state comparison chart as to how Model Rule 1.6 has been
modified by each state. Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts/ [https://perma.cc/7NWJ-5FL5].
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likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.”179 The Arizona rule
resembles a suggestion of Harry Subin, who, while advocating for lawyers’
legal obligation to reveal confidential information in order to prevent serious
harm, defines “harm” as “any conduct that would constitute a felony and
the continuing consequence of any conduct that would constitute a
felony.”180
The problem with the Arizona rule, as well as with Subin’s proposal, is
that, by interposing an intermediate inquiry into the criminal character of
the client’s behavior, they incorrectly shift the focus of the lawyer’s duty
back onto the client, thereby concealing the true source of the lawyer’s moral
obligation to disclose. If the arguments in this paper are correct, the origin
of the lawyer’s duty to disclose is in the rights of third parties to not be
harmed, rather than in the illegality of the client’s conduct. It is true that
when clients harm third parties, they will often be engaged in some form of
fraud or illegal conduct. Theranos is one such example. But that is not
always the case. In Merck’s marketing of Vioxx, there is no clear case of
fraud perpetrated by Merck. But even in the cases where the companies are
not committing fraud or any other illegality, lawyers will still have a moral
obligation to disclose information if the company does not do it of its own
accord. None of the arguments presented in this paper relied on the
illegality of the client’s conduct, as that is not where lawyers’ duties spring
from.
The latter point is most obvious in basic cases such as saving someone
from drowning and the like: ordinarily, how the drowning person came to
be placed in that position is irrelevant to whether one has a duty to rescue.
But the fact that we are dealing here with corporations does not essentially
change this aspect of the situation. Whether the company acted negligently,
recklessly, or intentionally in endangering others is irrelevant to the question
whether lawyers have a duty to disclose once they are apprised of the
relevant information. The only question at that point is whether or not the
company is willing to do something about it.
A further problem with the criminal conduct approach is that lawyers will
sometimes be put in the position to assess the criminality of their client’s
conduct where that issue is not clear. In some cases, it is far from certain
whether something constitutes a felony or some other kind of criminal
179. ARIZ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b); see also N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (using a very similar rule to Arizona).
180. Subin, supra note 74, at 1173.
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act.181 Especially in corporate cases, it will often be easier to assess the
likelihood of harm to other people than the criminal character of corporate
behavior.
It might be objected, however, that it will be often very difficult for a
lawyer to form an opinion as to the likelihood of harm to third parties,
especially when forming such an opinion involves assessing specialized
scientific information. The objection is pertinent as far as it goes. The
lawyer certainly cannot be asked to have the same degree of scientific
knowledge as an expert. However, in some cases the evidence will be clear
enough for the lawyer to form a reasonable opinion as to the potential harm
their client might be causing. Note that the ABA Model Rule 1.6 and its
state counterparts require only reasonable belief, not certainty, before a
lawyer is permitted or required to disclose.182 The lawyer may form such a
reasonable belief not only from reading a scientific report, but from other
sources of evidence as well. The lawyer’s conversations and interactions
with the company’s executives and personnel will also contribute to the
process of belief formation. Likewise, if the corporate client deviates
significantly from industry practice in certain areas, that may be further
evidence that something is amiss. Corroborating evidence from similar
reports or other sources may also play a role. Given all the evidentiary
sources that will ordinarily be taken into account by a lawyer in forming a
reasonable opinion as to corporate conduct, it would be an
oversimplification to picture a lawyer having to make a decision whether to
disclose confidential client information based solely on perusing one report
filled with scientific jargon (although that may also happen sometimes).
The rules of professional responsibility place no restrictions on how lawyers
may arrive at a reasonable belief about the client’s harmful conduct, so
lawyers will go about that process in the same way one forms reasonable
beliefs about anything else, namely by examining the strength of the
evidence, the trustworthiness of the evidentiary sources, and so on.183

181. Incidentally, it is not obvious why Subin’s proposed definition of “harm” restricts it to
felonies. Antecedently, there is nothing preventing misdemeanors from having serious harmful effects
on third parties. The same goes for tortious behavior.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
183. None of this is to deny that there will be cases in which the lawyer may defer to the
judgment of corporate executives. Sometimes the initial evidence of potential harm may be explained
away, or it might not warrant the conclusions lawyers have drawn from it. Such cases are best described
as lawyers ultimately not forming a reasonable belief about substantial harm to third parties.
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For the reasons stated above, it would be advisable to adopt something
like the Illinois, Washington, and Iowa exception to confidentiality, which
does not depend on the legal character (whether criminal, tortious or in any
other way illegal) of the client’s conduct. This is also one of the reasons why
Model Rule 1.13 is not adequate in this context, since it conditions the
corporate attorney’s up the ladder reporting on a person associated with the
company acting, intending to act, or refusing to act in a manner that is
“a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization.”184 There are at least
two other reasons why Rule 1.13 is inadequate. First, it does not mandate
that the attorney go outside the organization and report to the authorities.
The Rule is only permissive, so that it does not reflect the attorney’s moral
obligations. Second, the up the ladder reporting envisaged in Rule 1.13 does
not do justice to the urgent character of medical cases, where people’s lives
are at stake. In a situation where a corporate attorney has knowledge that
the organization is doing something that is putting people’s health at
significant risk of harm, going through all the steps in Rule 1.13 would be
too cumbersome, and third parties could be impacted significantly while the
organization decides on what to do. To be effective, Rule 1.13 should
provide that in such cases an attorney should be obligated to talk to the
highest authority in the organization; and if that authority does not act
within a reasonable period given the urgency of the situation, the lawyer
should be required to disclose to the proper outside authority. In the case
of medical companies, the regulator to report to would be the FDA.
So far, I have assumed that Rule 1.6, at least in its Illinois, Washington,
and Iowa incarnation (and other states that follow this model) does capture
the correct moral standard to be applied to lawyer disclosures in emergency
situations. But given the general character of the rule, this may not be so
clear. Unlike the court in Balla v. Gambro,185 other courts might not be
willing to interpret the language of the rule in such a way as to mandate
disclosures when public safety is at risk, but only when a specific individual
could be harmed. The possibility of such an interpretation represents yet
another reason for attorneys to not comply with their moral responsibilities.
Therefore, the rule should be modified to provide explicitly that it does
apply in cases of harm to public safety. It should be made clear that there
need not be an identifiable subject that would suffer reasonably certain
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
185. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991);
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death or substantial bodily harm, and that it is sufficient for there to be
someone who would be so affected. After all, for disclosure purposes, there
does not seem to be any legal or moral ground for distinguishing between
“there is an 80% probability that Johnny [a specific person] will be harmed”
and “there is a 80% probability that either patient1, or patient2, or . . .
patientn will be harmed.”186
One important issue that will have to be addressed in future research
concerns the appropriate incentives for attorneys to comply with the
disclosure regime advocated in this Article. Currently, attorneys do not
seem to have a lot of protection against retaliation by the corporation after
they disclose confidential information to the public. The court in Balla
refused to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.187
According to the court, the lawyer in that case was not faced with a choice
between, on the one hand, reporting his client’s conduct and potentially
losing his job, and on the other hand not reporting in order to salvage his
position. The lawyer was simply required to report under Illinois’
Rule 1.6—end of story.188 The court also voiced worries that permitting a
lawyer to sue their employer for retaliatory discharge would have a “chilling
effect” on the client–lawyer relationship, making the client less likely to ask
the lawyer for advice in certain sensitive matters.189
Similar kinds of problems arise for corporate attorneys under Section 806
(the Whistleblower Provision) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which on the face
of it offers whistleblower protection to public company employees,
including lawyers.190 Given the breadth of the at-will employment doctrine
adopted in many states, lawyers face serious obstacles in bringing retaliatory
discharge actions against their employers.191 It seems that this is a
generalized problem that affects in-house counsel in various areas of the
law.

186. I am using “80%” merely for illustrative purposes. In order to disclose, the lawyer needs
to have a reasonable belief that substantial harm will be caused. The reasonable belief standard is
inherently untranslatable into precise percentages.
187. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 110.
190. Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 252 (2009); see also Wadler v. Bio-Rad Lab’ys, Inc.,
916 F.3d 1176, 1191 (9th Cir. 2019) (illustrating a successful case of an attorney bringing a
whistleblower protection claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
191. Kim, supra note 192, at 252–53.
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a general solution to this
issue. It can only be suggested that states should adopt robust statutes
protecting lawyers against retaliatory discharge in cases involving
safeguarding public health and safety. These statutes should include both
reinstatement provisions and monetary compensation for lawyers who
suffer adverse effects after disclosing confidential information. Other
alternatives are also possible but are better left for another occasion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question whether lawyers have duties to third parties that may be
placed at risk of harm by the actions of the lawyers’ clients has received a
lot of attention in the professional responsibility literature. In this paper,
I have focused on the case of medical companies, and have distinguished
two main questions that need to be addressed in this context. The first is
whether lawyers do, as a matter of fact, have duties to third parties. Many
authors simply assume this to be the case, without arguing for this
assumption. The second question is whether duties to third parties, in case
they exist, may be overridden by other considerations. As to the first
question, I have argued that corporate lawyers do have moral obligations to
third parties who are at risk of substantial harm from products marketed by
the medical companies those lawyers provide legal advice for. The argument
relies on common sense morality, more specifically on the idea that one has
a duty to prevent harm to others when doing so comes at little cost to
oneself. The moral obligations of corporate lawyers in the medical context
takes the form of required disclosures to the regulatory authorities in case
the company itself decides to ignore potential harm to patients. The two
examples that I have taken to illustrate the kind of case where this duty
might arise were the release and subsequent withdrawal of the antiinflammatory drug Vioxx by the pharmaceutical company Merck, and the
marketing of a deficient blood testing device by the biotech startup
Theranos. I have defended the existence of corporate lawyers’ moral
obligations to third parties against arguments to the contrary based on the
notion that there is no duty to rescue, and that failing to act cannot be a
cause of harm.
Importantly, the existence of lawyers’ obligations to disclose does not
depend on the corporation’s degree of culpability. Whether the corporation
acted with negligence, recklessly or intentionally in endangering patients is
irrelevant. What matters is whether the company is disposed to inform the
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public once it is in possession of material information that could affect
patients’ choices and behavior. If there is no will to disclose at the higher
corporate echelons, lawyers with knowledge of such material information
who have a reasonable belief that patients will be harmed have a moral
obligation to alert the industry regulators, in particular the FDA.
Having established that lawyers do have moral obligations to third parties,
I have then argued that it is not plausible that these obligations are
overridden by other considerations. The reason is that the lawyers’
obligations in the medical context are grounded in patients’ rights, such as
the right not to be harmed or the right to life. Since these are very stringent
rights, it is unlikely that they can be infringed in this instance. Therefore,
lawyers will have to comply with their moral obligations to patients, should
it be necessary.
One important defense of the permissibility of lawyers’ noncompliance
with their duties to third parties relies on the lawyers’ duty of confidentiality
to their clients. I have shown, however, that confidentiality is not a
sufficiently robust concept to shield lawyers from what they are morally
required to do. Some states, such as Illinois or Washington, have already
implemented a version of Model Rule 1.6 that requires lawyers to disclose
confidential client information in order to prevent death or substantial
bodily harm, which is the correct result according to the view advocated in
this paper.

